Philanthropy and the “Management” of Working-Class Women: The West Gate Bridge Disaster by Humphrys E & Gregson S
 1 
Philanthropy and the “management” of working-class women:  
the West Gate Bridge disaster 
 
Sarah Gregson and Elizabeth Humphrys* 
 
The West Gate Bridge collapse in 1970 is one of the worst industrial disasters in Australian 
history. Closely examined for the engineering lessons it provides, scholarly interest in its 
historical, social, and industrial import is far less extensive. This article examines the role of 
union leaders, employers, and a private welfare organisation called the Citizens Welfare 
Service (CWS) in the management of funds raised to support the victims and families of the 
disaster. More broadly, it reveals philanthropic attitudes and practices adopted to manage 
working families’ needs in the 1970s that were not altogether dissimilar from those of 
nineteenth-century philanthropists. Despite the families’ raw grief in the immediate aftermath 
of the tragedy, “home visitors” from the CWS felt entitled to offer heavily gendered and class-
based advice to widows about frugal budgeting, domestic order, and composed behaviour. 
The case management style employed by this welfare agency demonstrated a derivative 
commitment to capitalist mores that promoted hard work and thrift, while stigmatising 
welfare dependence. 
 





When a section of the West Gate Bridge collapsed during construction in 1970, and 35 
employees were killed, the disaster had immediate family welfare consequences. Twenty-
eight women were widowed, 88 children lost their father, and 18 men required significant 
periods of hospitalisation.1 A Royal Commission investigation into the tragedy was quickly 
enacted by the Victorian state parliament and, for the most part, attribution of blame fell 
heavily on those responsible for the design and construction of the bridge.2 The collapse was 
front-page news across Australia for several months, as newspaper reporters covered the 
Royal Commission and interviewed survivors, rescue workers and family members who had 
lost loved ones.3 Public sympathy for the victims was profound and donations flooded into 
funds administered principally by the Herald newspaper, the Victorian Trades Hall Council 
(VTHC) and some municipal authorities. Indeed, VTHC records contain union subscription 
                                                          
* We thank Labour History’s anonymous referees for their helpful comments on this research. Special thanks go 
to Danny Gardiner and Tommy Watson, former West Gate workers, who were so generous with their time and 
knowledge.  
1 Citizens Welfare Service of Victoria (CWS), 2013.0122, West Gate Welfare Coordinating Committee (WWCC) 
minutes, 26 October 1970, Unit 3, 97/2170, University of Melbourne Archives [hereafter UMA]. 
2 See, for example, Gary Dean, “Two Engineering Firms Lose Their Jobs on West Gate Bridge,” The Age 
(Melbourne), 7 August 1971, 1; “Design Faults Finding Denied,” The Age (Melbourne), 4 August 1971, 11. The 
findings of the Royal Commission were published as Edward Barber, Frank Bull and Hubert Shirley-Smith, 
Report of Royal Commission into the Failure of West Gate Bridge, Report no. 7989, (Melbourne: Government 
Printer, 1971). 
3 See, for example, Alan Stewart, “Injured Covered in Oil, Blood,” The Herald (Melbourne), 16 October 1970, 2; 
“Funerals for 15 of Dead,” The Sun (Melbourne), 20 October 1970, 17; “I Must Return to the Bridge Says John,” 
The Herald (Melbourne), 19 October 1970, 7. 
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sheets filled out by thousands of workers from all over the country.4 Most of the widows 
received meagre state widows’ pensions almost immediately and, after engaging in individual 
litigation against the employers’ insurer, workers compensation payments.5 As Elliott notes, 
however, pensions in this period were insufficient to provide a bulwark against poverty; 
rather, for new pensioners, it was more commonly a descent into poverty.6 
In the face of community criticism regarding the low level of workers compensation 
payments available to victims and families, which had been a campaign issue for unions for 
many years, the Victorian government hurriedly increased mandated payments.7 Although 
the payments were backdated to cover those affected by the West Gate disaster, pursuit 
through the courts to secure entitlements was still a lengthy process. For a crucial period 
between the collapse and 1974 when the public fund collected for West Gate victims and 
families was wound up, therefore, many relied heavily on fund donations as a vital source of 
income. The principles adopted for disbursement of that fund are an important window into 
welfare philosophies in this period, suggesting that surviving records of fund administration 
can provide a hitherto unknown, albeit mediated, account of widows’ treatment in the 
aftermath of the collapse. The records revealed evidence of traditional attitudes towards 
working-class victims and families that affected delivery of, and access to, income and social 
support. Despite the profound nature of the families’ losses and the enormous funds 
collected for their benefit, the distribution principles that governed assistance to widows, 
injured workers and families were strongly imbued with conservative and gendered attitudes 
towards welfare dependence and working-class financial acumen. For grieving and distressed 
women, some caring for injured family members and traumatised children, domestic duties 
were intensified. At the same time, home visitors subjected them to advice on frugal 
budgeting, appropriate home management and composed behaviour, consistent with 




In early 1968, construction work began on a massive bridge across the Yarra River in 
Melbourne.8 By mid-October 1970, the project was well advanced but there were many 
problems on site — numerous disagreements between contractors, frequent episodes of 
industrial conflict, safety concerns that were given insufficient attention, and inadequate 
expert engineering oversight.9 On one occasion, after manoeuvring two half girders into 
place, workers found there was a significant difference in camber. A contentious decision was 
made to place “kentledge” — heavy concrete blocks — on one girder to force it into place, 
                                                          
4 VTHC, 2001.0020, Unit 378, UMA. 
5 Ken Stone from the VTHC noted that victims and dependants would engage legal counsel and initiate civil 
action compensation claims against the employers, but that payments would not be forthcoming for 2-3 
years. CWS, 2013.0122 WWCC, 26 October 1970, Unit 3, 97/2170. A majority of workers killed and injured in 
the collapse had worked for John Holland Constructions. 
6 Grant Elliott, “Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: An Australian Welfare State?” in Adam Graycar, ed. 
Perspectives in Australian Social Policy (South Melbourne: Macmillan, 1978), 35. 
7 “Labor says Antiquated on Workers’ Compo.,” The Sun (Melbourne), 21 October 1970, 44; “Union Ban on 
Bridge,” The Herald, 16 October 1970, 2; “Workers’ Aid Bill Introduced: West Gate Victims Will Benefit,” The 
Age (Melbourne), 28 October 1970, np. 
8 Bill Hitchings, West Gate (Collingwood: Outback Press, 1979). 
9 Barber et al., Report of Royal Commission, 99, 102; Carmel Egan, “West Gate: 20 Years After the Tragedy,” 
The Australian Magazine, 13 October 1990, 8-14. 
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but this process put the structure under immense stress and a bulge appeared in the section. 
On the morning of 15 October 1970, engineer David Ward ordered the removal of 30 bolts in 
an attempt to flatten the bulge. At 11.50 am, the structure could no longer bear the stress — 
witnesses said the steel turned blue, bolts snapped like gunfire, and the entire span between 
piers 10–11 collapsed while men were working both on it and under it.10 Rescue operations 
continued for some days; 33 men died at the scene and two died later in hospital. Some of 
the 18 injured were hospitalised for only a short period, while others sustained critical injuries 
that necessitated lengthy rehabilitation and/or permanent disability. The collapse site was 
cordoned off and family members were forced to wait into the night to hear news about their 
loved ones. The last two bodies were pulled out of the river on 23 October, eight days after 
the collapse.11 Many surviving workmates who stayed on site to assist with the rescue efforts 
became rarely acknowledged victims, suffering significant emotional distress for years after 
the disaster.  
In the aftermath of the collapse, the welfare of victims and families was an immediate 
concern. Two welfare committees were formed; the West Gate Fund Committee (WGFC) was 
responsible for administering disbursement of public donations and the West Gate Welfare 
Coordinating Committee (WWCC) undertook the home visiting required to assess family 
needs. All donations had been centralised under the control of the WGFC which comprised 
VTHC representatives and the secretaries of the seven affected unions,12 with a Union-Fidelity 
Company representative providing trust advice.13 This committee established all fund 
guidelines and authorised all distribution decisions made, but relied heavily on the 
information provided by the WWCC. The WWCC was formed when managers at John Holland 
Constructions (JHC), the principal employer of the dead and injured men, invited 
representatives from a number of welfare organisations to meet at the West Gate site office 
a few days after the collapse.14 Managing director, John Holland, had personal connections 
with the CWS and he asked Elizabeth Sharpe, its executive director, to provide case 
management services for victims’ families.15 Sharpe was elected committee chair to lead the 
                                                          
10 Brian Coles and Trevor Gourley, Collapse of the West Gate Bridge: A Case Study for Engineering Students 
(Melbourne: Worksafe Victoria, 2002), 7-8. 
11 These were Barney Butters and his trades assistant, Des Gibson, the two men who had been ordered to pull 
out the bolts. The Sun (Melbourne), 24 October 1970. 
12 These were the Amalgamated Engineering Union, the Australasian Society of Engineers, the Boilermakers 
and Blacksmiths’ Society of Australia, the Builders Labourers’ Federation, the Building Workers’ Industrial 
Union, the Federated Engine Drivers and Firemen’s Association, and the Federated Iron Workers’ 
Association of Australia. 
13 Herald management invited union trustees to administer distribution of its fund. VTHC, 2001.0020, Letter, 
Ken Stone, VTHC Secretary to Sir Phillip Jones, Chairman, Herald and Weekly Times (Melbourne), 8 October 
1974, Unit 60, 48/1974, UMA. 
14 CWS, 2013.0122, WWCC minutes, 20 October, Unit 3, 97/2170, UMA. 
15 It is noteworthy that Holland, his senior engineers, Sharpe, and some executive members of the CWS, had 
existing employment and social ties formed via work histories in military command, rescue operations, 
medical services, and the police force. Sharpe, for example, had been an operations officer in the RAF during 
World War II. John Sorell, “Quite a Wonderful Woman,” The Herald (Melbourne), 9 November 1970, 2. In 
addition, Oscar Meyer, chairman of the Lower Yarra Crossing Authority that hired bridge contractors, also 
served in World War II. Other attendees at the meeting were VTHC officials, and representatives from various 
public and private welfare organisations, including St Vincent de Paul, the Salvation Army, Birthright, and the 
Pensions and Social Services Department. It is worth noting at this point that Holland asked the CWS to provide 
services for which he did not commit to pay. Instead, responsibility for payment fell on reluctant WGFC 
trustees who were initially under the impression that home visiting work would be done on a voluntary basis. 
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welfare work and a plan of action was formulated — a “command post”16 was to be 
established on site to: facilitate communication between various groups; prepare an 
information sheet about social service entitlements, workers compensation benefits, and 
contacts for legal and social welfare advice; develop a questionnaire for interviewing victims 
and families; and organise approaches to industry sources for financial support.17 After CWS 
case workers had called at each family’s home, Sharpe reported to the WGFC about the level 
of financial support required in each case and this helped to determine both overall 
distribution policies and individual assistance required. As advocates for the dead workers, 
the union secretaries assumed responsibility for distributing monies to their members’ 
widows and families, a role perhaps familiar to union leaders with experience of “friendly 
society” welfare practices. To them, the scale of the West Gate disaster and the enormous 
fund to be dispersed required a high level of domestic intervention.18 This forced the WGFC 
to recognise warily that it would need to rely on the WWCC’s welfare expertise, especially the 
staff of the CWS. Despite the WGFC’s reliance on Elizabeth Sharpe and her organisation, 
Sharpe had to press for inclusion on the fund committee (where financial power resided) and 
payment for services rendered (upon which the CWS relied to survive). Senior JHC staff were 
also placed in a subordinate role to both committees that they were in no position to 
challenge openly, due to public perceptions about the company’s partial responsibility for the 
disaster.19 Engineer Tom Robinson complained that he had “spent several hours cross-
checking all information in [employee] files” and entering the information on sheets for the 
CWS. “I can’t say I am very happy about the Unions disbursing cash,” he wrote peevishly. “[I] 
have just done all their donkey work for them and prepared a schedule of payments.”20 Most 
notably, the JHC representatives insisted that their “humane action” must not be viewed by 
the courts as any admission of liability.21  
The scholarly literature on Australian social welfare systems only fitfully describes the 
political and social context in which the West Gate disaster took place. After World War II, 
state delivery of social services expanded, while retaining a significant role for private 
agencies.22 At the time of the collapse, both Federal and Victorian state politics were 
dominated by Liberal Party policies that embraced hard work, self-reliance and minimal state 
intervention. Welfare distribution operated on a hybrid model — government agencies 
administered universal statutory schemes like widow and invalid pensions, while non-
government relief agencies offered “residual” support to those who needed more assistance 
than state-run systems offered. Private philanthropic organisations kept themselves afloat on 
                                                          
16 Note the military tone of the language adopted. 
17 CWS, 2013.0122, Memorandum on the coordination of welfare action following occasions of industrial 
calamity, WWCC minutes, West Gate Bridge site office, 20 October 1970, Unit 3, 97/2170, UMA. 
18 One West Gate survivor remembered that the union movement had insufficient resources to deal with the 
disaster. Attending funerals, visiting those hospitalised, facing unemployment, suffering trauma themselves, 
for surviving workmates, “It was just too big for us,” he said. Tommy Watson, interview with authors, 7 
February 2018. 
19 This sentiment became more pronounced as media coverage of the Royal Commission proceedings reported 
witnesses’ evidence. 
20 CWS, 2013.0122, Note, Tom Robinson to Elizabeth Sharpe, 22 October 1970, Unit 3, 97/2170, UMA. 
21 CWS, 2013.0122, typescript, “Memorandum on the coordination of welfare action following occasions of 
industrial calamity,” undated, circa 20 October 1970, Unit 3, 97/2170, UMA. 
22 Erik Eklund, Melanie Oppenheimer and Joanne Scott, eds, The State of Welfare: Comparative Studies of the 
Welfare State at the End of the Long Boom, 1965-1980 (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2018), 86. 
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a mixture of public funding and private contributions.23 As Roe put it, governments’ role was 
to “subsidize existing providers and voluntary agencies, rather than extend State 
responsibility.”24 It was in this context that the CWS came to play a major role in the West 
Gate disaster. While Dickey does not mention the CWS explicitly in his history of social welfare 
in Australia, his description of “citizens advice bureaus” is apt — these agencies relied upon 
annual government grants, volunteer fundraising, and overworked professional social 
workers to generate operating capital. Profoundly conservative and committed to the 
maintenance of unequal social relations, he argued, these agencies nonetheless showed “a 
capacity to achieve local co-ordination and action usually beyond the scope of rule-bound, 
category dominated distributors of government cash payments and subsidies.”25 
For this research on welfare distribution in the aftermath of the West Gate disaster, 
we accessed Victorian Trades Hall Council (VTHC) and CWS records held in the University of 
Melbourne Archives that helped map these organisations’ involvement in relief 
administration. In particular, the CWS’s role in the work provided an opportunity to examine 
philanthropic practices in the 1970s, via a set of records pertaining to its dealings with the 
families. Even if the documents within this archival collection were written from social worker 
and fund trustee perspectives, they provide key insights about the longevity of COS influence 
beyond that so far recognised in previous Australian studies. Because many CWS records were 
destroyed when the organisation moved offices, any surviving sources are particularly 
significant.26 In addition, the bridge’s collapse and the subsequent Royal Commission were 
well covered by media outlets, whose coverage we were able to draw upon.27 While news 
articles were principally focused on the royal commission evidence, occasional references to 
victims’ families and their circumstances were revealing. Names of West Gate fund recipients 
and other potentially identifying details have been redacted. It was difficult to find evidence 
of widows’ impressions and so some of our analysis relies heavily upon interpretation of CWS 
employees’ impressions. We recognise this as a challenge with this kind of research — that 
workers’ experiences are often not recorded by workers themselves but instead refracted 
through the records of organisations — state, media, welfare etc — with which they come 
into contact.28 Nonetheless, we consider the evidence we did find to be valuable for 
understanding class and gender-based attitudes to welfare recipients in the 1970s. Because 
the subject matter discussed in this article has never previously been explained, we have 
adopted a predominantly narrative framework to assist readers who will be unfamiliar with 
many of the events that transpired. 
The article proceeds as follows — the next section considers the origins of Citizens 
Welfare Service philosophies and procedures in its predecessor, the Charity Organisation 
Society (COS). This section provides an appreciation of the historical foundations and 
contemporaneous guiding principles that influenced the CWS’s work with the West Gate 
families. Then we examine the operation of the West Gate fund, highlighting evidence from 
meeting minutes, correspondence files, and policy documents that shed light on the decisions 
                                                          
23 Philip Mendes, Australia’s Welfare Wars Revisited: The Players, the Politics and the Ideologies, (Kensington: 
UNSW Press, 2008), 21; Eklund, et al., The State of Welfare, 1. 
24 Jill Roe, ed., Social Policy in Australia: Some Perspectives 1901-1975 (Stanmore: Cassell Australia, 1976), 314. 
25  Brian Dickey, No Charity There: A Short History of Social Welfare in Australia (Nelson: Melbourne, 1980), 203. 
26 Richard Kennedy, Charity Warfare: The Charity Organisation Society in Colonial Melbourne (South Yarra: 
Hyland House, 1985), viii-ix. 
27 Mainstream Melbourne dailies such as The Age, the Sun News-Pictorial, Daily Mail and The Herald were 
examined, as well as the Communist Party of Australia weekly newspaper, Tribune (Sydney). 
28 Paul Thompson with Joanne Bornat, The Voice of the Past, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 4. 
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made and practices adopted to deliver social welfare services to families. Our conclusion 
argues that elements of West Gate fund administration reveal condescending attitudes 
towards victims and families that affected their access to relief. 
 
The CWS: origins, philosophy and organisation  
 
Until 1947, the Melbourne CWS was known as the COS. Like its British exemplar founded in 
London in 1869, the Melbourne COS promoted “systematic” reform of philanthropic 
endeavours.29 Beneath an energetic program of financial relief, social research, health care 
administration, family counselling and work placement, COS policies were riven with 
conservative attitudes towards poor people. Influential in the development of professional 
social work through case management, training and home visiting, the COS competed with 
other welfare agencies for ideological ascendancy. Although not without critics,30 COS charity 
management philosophies were widespread.31 In the late-Victorian period, COS leaders 
recommended vetting individual welfare requests to ascertain whether applicants were 
“deserving” or “undeserving” to prevent indiscriminate welfare distribution. Using reports 
from “lady visitors” who inspected claimants’ domestic circumstances, administrators 
controlled extensions of help “scientifically” on the basis of compliance with middle-class 
values such as respectability, hard work, thrift, sexual propriety, and cleanliness.32  
To COS proselytisers, haphazard giving was more a cause of pauperism and social 
demoralisation than a response to it.33 Mowat described the COS approach as “indiscriminate 
charity demoralized; it encouraged habits of laziness and dependence; it harmed under the 
guise of help. True charity was concerned to strengthen character and to preserve the family 
as the fundamental unit of society.”34 As Woodroofe summarised, to COS evangelists, 
“character, and not circumstance, was the explanation of failure.”35 Even in the post-World 
War II period, the data Musgrove gleaned from case files suggested that moralistic 
assessments were an enduring tool in the welfare workers’ toolkit. She also illustrates how 
welfare applicants found it difficult to exercise agency from a position of dependency and low 
social status.36  
Peel’s focus on interactions between assessors and applicants suggests that women 
claimants’ attitudes during home visits might override negative assessments about the 
material circumstances in which a family lived. Most likely to get a kind hearing, he argued, 
                                                          
29 For interesting insights re the emergence of the COS, see Michael J.D. Roberts, “Charity Disestablished? The 
Origins of the Charity Organisation Society Revisited, 1868-1871,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 54, no. 1 
(2003): 40-61. 
30 See a review of Charles L. Mowat, The Charity Organization Society, 1869-1913: Its Ideas and Work by Muriel 
W. Pumphrey, Social Service Review 36, no. 1 (1962): 95-6. 
31 Charles L. Mowat, “Charity and Casework in Late Victorian London: The Work of the Charity Organisation 
Society,” Social Service Review 31, no. 3 (1957): 260. 
32 For examples of grassroots studies, see Annie Skinner, “‘Voice of the Visitors’: An Exploration of the Work of 
the Charity Organisation Society in Oxford, 1878-1880,” Midland History 40, no. 1 (2015): 74-94; Sarah 
Gregson “Women and Children First? The Administration of the Titanic Relief Fund in Southampton, 1912-
1959,” English Historical Review 127, no. 254 (2012): 83-109. 
33 Kathleen Woodroofe, “The Charity Organisation Society and the Origins of Social Casework,” Australian 
Historical Studies 9, no. 33 (1959): 19-29. 
34 Mowat, “Charity and Casework,” 260. 
35 Woodroofe, “The Charity Organisation Society,” 20. 
36 Nell Musgrove, “‘Filthy’ Homes and ‘Fast’ Women: Welfare Agencies’ Moral Surveillance in Post‐second World 
War Melbourne,” Journal of Australian Studies 27, no. 80 (2003): 111-119. 
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were those who could “feel their position,” having found themselves in circumstances to 
which they were not normally accustomed.37 Anger and pride were not pathways to 
assistance. As a case study of the 1970s, we wondered if our research would support or qualify 
the hopeful nature of Mark Peel’s assessment that the “haphazard science of impressions and 
judgements” that determined deservingness was not as common on the ground as it was 
encouraged in official policy prescriptions.38 Moreover, as he noted, a lot more might be said 
about the COS’s “postwar shift to a different conception of its relationship to citizens and 
their welfare”: this case study, we argue, highlights the fractured nature of that transition.39 
Like many private agencies, the CWS’s management structure was partly professional, 
partly voluntary. 40 It had an executive committee comprising volunteer well-to-do “citizens” 
and patrons, many from the military, the church, and politics. Former prime minister Robert 
Menzies was a patron, and society doyen and wife of an ex-Lord Mayor of Melbourne, Beryl 
Beaurepaire, occupied several senior roles. In a professional capacity, executive director 
Elizabeth Sharpe oversaw a team of salaried social workers, psychiatrists, auditors and legal 
advisors.41 The Herald described Sharpe as “a quite wonderful woman” who ran the CWS 
efficiently, even though its work was “stifled” by lack of funds and public acknowledgement.42  
The organisation was in a dire budget situation — allegedly $18,000 “in the red,” the 
CWS received only $5,000 annually from the Hospitals and Charities Commission and $7,500 
from the Commonwealth in 1970, relying on private philanthropic donations for additional 
funds.43 “We can’t cope with the demands made on us,” said Sharpe. “Everybody vaguely 
realises that welfare is a commodity we’ll need, but nobody wants to pay for it.”44 In the 
period under review, the CWS expanded, hiring more staff which put pressure on scarce 
financial resources; just two days before the West Gate collapse, administrators were 
discussing ways to reduce financial assistance to clients, operate on a more business-like 
basis, and “seek out areas where re-imbursement for services rendered may be expected.”45 
Although the CWS was avowedly non-denominational, it was overwhelmingly Protestant. A 
point of distinction from Catholic-led benevolent societies and other church-run 
organisations, it lacked equivalent institutional support and was therefore mindful to avoid 
alienating any potential private donors.46  
In the post-World War II period, the CWS’s primary focus was on family counselling, 
but there was occasional tension between the organisation’s espoused mission and public 
expectations of the CWS’s role. In 1969, Sharpe addressed an annual meeting of contributors 
                                                          
37 Mark Peel, “Charity, Casework and the Dramas of Class in Melbourne, 1920-1940: ‘Feeling Your Position,’” 
History Australia 2, no. 3 (2005): 83.3. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., 83.11. 
40 CWS, 2013.0113, minutes of Board of Management meeting, 24 February 1971, Unit 70, 55/2031, UMA 
Brunswick [unless specifically indicated as located at the UMA Brunswick repository, all other CWS records 
were accessed at the Baillieu Library UMA]. 
41 See, for example, CWS Annual Report, 1971. 
42 Sorell, “Quite a Wonderful Woman, 2. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 CWS typescript, 13 October 1970, 2013.0122, Unit 1, 78/1614, UMA. Anthony Birch, “Framing Fitzroy: 
Contesting and (De)constructing Place and Identity in a Melbourne Suburb” (PhD diss., University of 
Melbourne, 2002), 204-5. 
46 Senior CWS social worker, Jill Williams, said being “non-everything” was a strength, because it enabled the 
Service to be “flexible” and so better meet the needs of community. Report of proceedings, meeting held 19 
November 1969, CWS, 2013.0113, Unit 73, 55/2055, UMA Brunswick. 
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about the utility of the CWS’s services for all Victorian residents. She felt it regrettable that 
“social work was still thought of as being needed by only the poor, deprived and uneducated;” 
more importantly, she felt, there was a need for the CWS’s focus on the preservation of family 
life.47 For Sharpe, the psychological elements of the organisation’s counselling work were 
paramount; financial aid to meet the temporary exigencies of poverty-stricken lives was a 
necessary evil but, like her COS predecessors, she felt immediate relief was a mundane 
activity in comparison with the more urgent task of reforming the welfare system and 
delivering moral instruction to clients. In fact, Sharpe was adamant that the CWS was not a 
relief agency; rather, relief was only “an aid to counselling.”48 For her, it was “an instrument 
of reform of the whole structure of community institutions for relief and welfare and not 
merely another charitable agency among others.” Despite this, the organisation did need 
significant capital to run its services. Home visiting remained an important element of CWS 
case work when dealing with families experiencing financial difficulties. One of its reports 
read, “Work with low-income families, who are often overwhelmed with financial problems, 
requires a considerable amount of home visiting, and we have one worker who specialises in 
this. We regard home visiting as an important part of our service, as it increases our 
accessibility to this group.”49 For case workers, counselling was used to promote hard work 
and conscientiousness among family members in pursuit of a peaceful, self-sufficient home 
life. Sharpe promised potential donors that “we help all without regard to race or creed, but 
our fundamental aim is to promote the well-being of the family as a whole, for a sound society 
is based upon a sound family life.” Indeed, the organisation’s motto was “Keep the Family 
Together.”50 
The professionalisation of social work was also central to the CWS’s overall mission. 
Staff played an active role in the training and placement of social workers, believing the 
welfare sector’s future depended on its influence — to this end, work experience was 
arranged for social work students within the CWS and it acted as a personnel agency for the 
sector. “Teaching of social work students who come here to gain experience in casework is 
regarded as part of our service to the community,” one policy document read, particularly as 
there were case worker shortages.51 Administrators promoted the longstanding links 
between the CWS and Melbourne University, arguing that valuable research projects could 
emerge from casework experiences.52 Social work students received mentoring and hands-
on experience, used the Service’s library, and discussed cases with CWS staff in “an intelligent 
exchange of views and ideas.”53 This organisational network of welfare administrators, 
academia and industry is an interesting window into ways in which these interest groups 
might collaborate around a shared agenda.54 In addition, despite competition for funds and 
influence, staff of various benevolent groups also got together to discuss current challenges 
                                                          
47 CWS minutes, 82nd Annual Meeting of contributors, 27 August 1969, Melbourne Town Hall, 2013.0113, Unit 
57, 55/1609, UMA Brunswick. 
48 CWS, typescript, 13 October 1970, 2013.0122 Unit 1, 78/1614, UMA. 
49 Report of Proceedings, Working Day, 19 November 1969, CWS, 2013.0113, Unit 73, 55/2055, UMA Brunswick. 
50 “This Charity is Raising Quite a Stir,” The Herald (Melbourne), 13 May 1971, 2. 
51 CWS typescript, 13 October 1970, 2013.0122, Unit 1, 78/1614, UMA. 
52 Ibid. 
53 CWS, 2013.0122, typescript, John I Henning and Peter Daughtry, “The Role of the Social Worker in Relation to 
Industry,” 26 August 1971, 78/1615, UMA. 
54 For further explication, see Ellen S. O’Connor, “The Politics of Management Thought: A Case Study of the 
Harvard Business School and the Human Relations School,” Academy of Management Review 24, no. 1 (1999): 
117-131. 
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in the sector.55 Some CWS staff were cognisant of changing social welfare mores, where 
community demands and greater professionalisation might challenge private agency 
autonomy. In 1970, CWS researcher Connie Benn advised Victorian Opposition leader, Clyde 
Holding, that affluence gave more currency in the community to “democratic and humanistic 
philosophies” towards welfare recipients. Her research suggested that both social workers 
and consumers of services were wanting a greater say in policy making and leadership of 
voluntary agencies.56  
Kennedy draws a vivid picture of Melbourne’s “charity web” in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, comprising a host of benevolent organisations operated by wealthy 
people as part philanthropy, part social network. Men’s work commonly involved controlling 
the finances, drawing on “old school tie” networks in business and politics to garner official 
support and funding. Women’s prestige, often correlated with a husband’s social position, 
was enhanced by effective fundraising at elite gatherings.57 In the early 1970s, a newspaper 
article on Melbourne’s “charity circuit” highlighted the mechanics of fund-raising. The 
professional charity worker must host events wealthy people would want to be seen 
attending. A “typical” charity socialite living “not too far south” of the river Yarra dividing the 
city, “bounces from bruncheon to luncheon, to cocktail party … to dinner dance, to supper 
party. If she decides to go to everything she is invited to in one week, she can spend $280 — 
just on tickets. Then there are the hair-dos, taxis, clothes and baby-sitters.”58 For wealthy or 
socially ambitious women, charity work helped to develop connections and community 
standing. Indeed, the Smith Family in Sydney became so bothered by status seekers that it 
instituted a ban on office bearers receiving publicity. “This is to ensure our organisation is not 
used as a vehicle for social climbing,” said its spokesperson.59 
Without its social networks, the CWS would have struggled to survive, as government 
stipends were always contingent and insufficient. Highly systematic fundraising was an ever-
present necessity and countless hours of staff and volunteer time were devoted to wringing 
the last possible dollar from donors. Bequests comprised a large component of the 
organisation’s funds in reserve; letters were sent to beneficiaries of significant estates to 
advise them of the Service’s work and request donations.60 Corporate donors, too, were 
targeted by way of letters that detailed future projects, annual expenditure and any current 
deficit. Lists were formulated of companies to approach and any members of the 
management committee who had personal ties with a potential target were inveigled upon 
to soften the approach.61 Annual meetings were held at the Melbourne Town Hall to report 
to contributors about the organisation’s work. At these meetings, a guest speaker would 
deliver a lecture. In 1971, the speaker was E. Angus Jones CMG, an oil company executive, 
who spoke on “The Importance of Social Work to Industry.”62 The following year, the audience 
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59 Ibid. 
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61 CWS, 2013.0113, Unit 57, 55/1585, UMA Brunswick. 
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member of the Lower Yarra Crossing Authority and attended meetings of the WWCC. 84th Annual Meeting of 
 10 
heard from Mr J. Knott, CBE Director-General Posts and Telegraphs (PMG), whose lecture was 
entitled “The Social Side of the Post Office” in which he made special mention of its welfare 
section. He stressed “the importance placed on the individual, his needs and problems in 
relation to his work” and described the many social functions organised by the PMG for 
workers and their families.63 Therefore, although the CWS claimed non-denominational 
status regarding religion, they were not agnostic about their class affiliations. Their executive 
committee meetings were held at the Victorian Employers’ Federation boardroom, where the 
Federation also provided lunch to attendees.64 
The CWS’s interest in social work and welfarism in the workplace was more than 
theoretical; it was keen to promote its counselling services to employers and maintained close 
links with managers who adopted welfarist policies in their workplaces. Welfarism has a long 
industrial history and, while frequently characterised as an amelioration of “scientific 
management” methods, there were strong elements of industrial psychology behind welfarist 
strategies as well. Balnave and Markey characterise welfarism as a management tactic — 
offering both more engaged employee participation and material benefits to workers, beyond 
those stipulated in formal industrial instruments, that might act as a bulwark against trade 
unionism. By offering welfare “benefits,” managers hoped to strengthen and legitimise 
corporate control and public reputation, as well as increase organisational efficiency.65 The 
CWS’s promotion of individual responsibility, strong family ties and financial independence 
potentially made it a sympathetic ally in the development of a collaborative workforce. That 
said, welfarist schemes waxed and waned in popularity among both employers and 
employees. On the employer side, while engendering a sense of “family” within a firm might 
have all sorts of psycho-social benefits for the organisation, managers wanted a return on 
investment and worried that some welfare schemes were too costly to warrant the 
expenditure. Even counselling required the employment of psychologists and might interrupt 
work time. This meant that such concessions to labour were often unpopular with 
shareholders.66 From employees’ perspectives, welfare benefits garnered varying responses 
from enthusiasm to disinterest to suspicion of the “insinuating manner of the Boss.”67 
Because housing schemes and libraries, counselling and recreational amenities were offered 
at the employers’ discretion, workers well knew that benefits could just as easily be 
withdrawn, especially as retribution if industrial conflict emerged.68 Unfortunately for the 
CWS’s entrepreneurial endeavours, the organisation arguably embraced welfarism as a 
potential income stream just as it was being jettisoned elsewhere in favour of a different 
“cultural” turn towards human resource management. Nevertheless, the Service’s eagerness 
to bolster corporate employment strategies is important to note in regard to the promotion 
of “strong work ethic” ideals among the West Gate families.  
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In the early 1970s, the CWS explored opportunities to commodify its services by 
establishing a dedicated “industrial wing” that offered bulk services to employers on a fee 
basis. Sharpe’s notes in preparation of the 1972 CWS Annual Report revealed her approach: 
 
Within the concept of the Industrial Wing lies a growing concern by the employer for 
his employee, and an understanding of those factors which cause poor work incentive, 
absenteeism and general work sluggishness. By the provision of a skilled service to 
assist with personal problems, CWS is convinced that production will increase, the 
economy will benefit and the quality of work satisfaction be enhanced. Given the 
necessary resources CWS will vigorously pursue this avenue of special service to the 
benefit of the Community work force.69 
 
An expert sociologist arrived from the US to take up a position as the wing’s first 
director. Sharpe sought funds for this project through approaches to the Victorian 
government; in a meeting with conservative Premier Henry Bolte, $20,000 was pledged with 
a recommendation that the CWS seek a matching contribution from the federal 
government.70 The Industrial Wing recruited several customers including two municipal 
councils, the Victorian Railways, Olympic Consolidated Industries, Myer, and Carlton United 
Breweries. However, some companies thought its services too expensive and were reluctant 
to commit to more than a trial arrangement.71 Policy drafts in CWS’s files decried the “relative 
ignorance” on both sides of the employment relationship about the benefits of social work in 
industrial settings.72 These documents maintained that the workplace presence of a social 
worker would signify a firm’s reputation as a “good employer.” Likewise, information placed 
on noticeboards about counselling services might reduce turnover and improve troubled 
employees’ performance.73 In this way, CWS expertise offered a cheaper, more effective 
option than hiring in-house industrial psychologists; workers may prefer an external 
intermediary if internal counsellors were potentially management “stooges.”74 Foremen too, 
it was contended, were unsuited for welfare work, as training could never resolve the 
fundamental conflict of interest that arises between counselling workers with personal 
problems and meeting production schedules. “It is unsound to expect the worker to regard 
the foreman in the role of confidante — the foreman’s job is to produce and to apply his work 
force to the job of production.”75 Given the CWS’s long history of information-gathering from 
neighbours, doctors, and teachers, and general working-class mistrust of “the welfare,” it is 
questionable whether workers would have viewed its counsellors in the workplace as 
benign.76 By the mid-1970s, all mention of the Industrial Wing had disappeared from annual 
reports, however, suggesting the CWS’s entrepreneurialism in this arena had not been 
successful. 
The CWS’s work with adolescents also had a labour discipline focus, on the basis that 
early intervention with youth who avoided study and/or paid work was vital. In the 1970s, an 
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era often characterised by rock music, communes, hippies and recreational drugs, CWS 
leaders felt that full employment had created a troubling independence among young people 
who no longer showed steadfastness towards their employer: “Their ability to flit from job to 
job at will and their disinclination to achieve skilled artisan status makes them a particularly 
difficult problem.”77 In marriage guidance counselling work, too, CWS social workers were a 
boon to industry — if workers were happy at home, multiple sources of improvement in their 
work performance might accrue, both individually and collectively. In short, it was argued, 
“Our experience indicates that if management cares, the worker cares.”78 Demonstrating an 
even greater commitment to management goals than management themselves, the CWS 
extolled their services thus:  
 
By injecting an interest on the part of management in the emotional well-being of 
the work force, the result must be the elimination of poor work incentive, the 
reduction of absenteeism and the reduction or elimination of the accident rate. 
The benefit which accrues to industry is the maintenance of a more stable and 
efficient work force, with better production rates and standards.79 
 
With ideas so aligned with the business community, it is hardly surprising that the CWS 
was seen by John Holland as a suitable organisation to oversee West Gate relief. With a staff 
of ten social workers who were assigned geographically, it worked in tandem with JHC staff 
to make “professional assessments” of those affected by the West Gate tragedy, assisting “53 
units of people” divided into six zones.80  
 
The administration of the West Gate funds 
 
Public sympathy for the West Gate victims was widespread. The VTHC sent out circulars, 
encouraging union members to contribute; in this way, thousands of dollars were raised 
from workplace collections.81 Donations were often accompanied by a message of sympathy 
— for example, with a cheque for $18, a note from Cullen Bullen miners read “this collection 
was taken up at our Colliery, which is only very small but we do hope it will help in some 
small way.”82 Although the West Gate fund was an enormous exercise, doing a “whip 
around” for a worker or family experiencing hard times was common practice in the union 
movement — Pat Preston, a crane driver shop steward on the site, estimated that West 
Gate workers had contributed $122,000 to various funds over the life of the project.83 
Neighbourhoods were active too. In Altona, for example, a suburb deeply affected by the 
death toll, the council waived its prohibition on door-to-door fundraising and hundreds of 
locals joined a collection drive.84 By late October, the mayor advised that approximately 
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$3,000 had been raised and local industries had been solicited with positive results.85 In 
total, approximately $266,000 was raised and interest dividends increased that figure to 
$273,000.86  
 The rules of the fund emerged through an accretion of Committee decisions. The 
fund’s objectives were “aiding and assisting the widows and children of deceased victims and 
allow[ing] for education and general maintenance of children.”87 The WGFC decided that 
payments to families would take three forms: firstly, a weekly payment “to those who could 
not be relied upon to manage their own budgeting satisfactorily;” secondly, supplementary 
amounts for irregular bills like dental work or household repairs; and, lastly, large grants that 
might, for example, settle significant debts or pay a deposit on a property.88 VTHC secretary, 
Ken Stone, wanted payments distributed to the families quickly so that household income 
was not disturbed. As most applications for widow’s pensions had been granted,89 he argued 
that any further amounts from the fund “should not be divided into equal amounts to 
claimants,” but instead determined on an individual “needs” basis.90 While this decision 
potentially gave more to larger families, it also exacerbated inequality. For example, it was 
unanimously agreed that the six families of senior supervisors who had been killed could 
access the fund and because, in the view of the WGFC, “families in the higher income group 
were possibly affected most by income and outgoing commitments,”91 a flat rate of $100 per 
week was allocated to them.92 Their situations, the trustees decided, “were not much 
different from others affected.”93 Some workers’ families, however, received as little as $36 
per week. Although these payments were bolstered by lump sums paid over for special 
purposes, such requests were subject to the committee’s approval.94 WGFC members 
discussed the potential “dangers” involved in raising families’ living standards by paying them 
lump sums.95 They expressed a unanimous preference “to preserve the take-home pay 
situation [and not] lift people out of their usual environment.”96 This was an extraordinary 
stance for union officials to take and speaks volumes about their moderate class politics; 
essentially, these decisions amplified the autonomy of wives of supervisory staff while 
restraining the economic prospects of union members’ wives and families.97  
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While JHC employment records were necessary to establish victims’ and families’ 
eligibility for assistance, the company’s influence on distribution appeared to go beyond the 
performance of simple administrative tasks. JHC staff had prepared lists for the WWCC, 
detailing the personal and financial situation of each affected family.98 Subjective impressions 
of injured and deceased workers’ employment histories were noted in welfare files, 
suggesting that loyal service was a factor in the treatment of widows and families and that 
the husband’s reputation as a “good worker” in life was considered when assessing assistance 
his widow might receive after his death. While most names attracted no comment, against 
several names were annotations about victims’ character and work record: one was described 
as an “excellent type — recently from UK;” another had a “good reputation;” and, yet another 
was “a fine type of man.” One victim who was in hospital was described as “v. good type & 
reliable.” Reflective of longstanding welfare practices that judged women’s character by the 
cleanliness of their homes and children,99 wives, too, were assessed. The condition of one 
widow’s home was noted as “House run down, not painted for years.” Another had been in a 
de facto relationship with a deceased worker; it was recorded that this was still “a genuine 
relationship” because the wife was a divorced Catholic who had been rejected by her 
husband’s family. Notes revealed that she had “built up a nice home,” had capacity for low-
skilled work and was a “genuine citizen.” It was also documented when a dependant exhibited 
“resentment” regarding their situation.100 The precise effect of these impressions is unknown, 
but the making of notations alone suggests a potential for bias. Because many fund decisions 
were made on an ad hoc basis, it was impossible to fully ascertain their net effects, but some 
decisions contained perceptible detriments for workers’ families. Welfare payments were 
calculated on base wages, for example, negatively impacting upon those families where the 
deceased worker had earned substantial overtime pay and penalty rates prior to the collapse. 
Miss Sharpe noted that mortgage and hire purchase payments were a source of considerable 
worry for some widows without that extra income.101  
Impatience with some of the more impoverished widows surfaced in CWS visitors’ 
notes. For example, one widow’s capacity for independence was deemed low; although she 
had a job with a small wage, she was described judgementally as “[l]ow IQ, uncertain 
future.”102 In another case, a migrant widow’s anxieties frustrated her social worker. Shortly 
after the collapse, the widow’s house was burgled of valuable possessions. In addition, her 
son had been “acting out” after the death of his father, threatening his mother with violence. 
Understandably, the widow called family overseas regularly for emotional support and to 
arrange for her son’s repatriation but, subsequently, received a large telephone bill she was 
unable to pay. Her lawyers advised the trustees that she spoke “very little English,” her health 
had “deteriorated” recently, and the telephone was, she felt, a “necessity, rather than a 
luxury.” Nonetheless, she was “warned…to keep the account within her means.”103 Social 
worker notes about this case show clear signs of condescension — that this widow was 
“coping inadequately,” that she was excessively anxious about her problems, and was unable 
                                                          
98   CWS, 2013.0122, John Holland Construction Group, Summary Information, Dependants of West Gate Disaster 
Victims, 23 November 1970, Unit 3, 97/2170, UMA. 
99   Musgrove, “‘Filthy’ homes,” 115-119. 
100  Ibid. 
101 Sorell, “Quite a Wonderful Woman, 2. 
102 VTHC, 2001.0020, typescript, Confidential: Citizens Welfare Service of Victoria, West Gate, Information for 
Trustees, circa early 1971, Unit 13, 78/1972, UMA. 
103 VTHC, 2001.0020, Letter, Widow’s lawyers to WGFC, 15 March 1972, WGFC sub-committee minutes, 29 
March 1972, Unit 13, 78/1972, UMA. 
 15 
to “tackle any of them effectively.” To address this, a CWS social worker was helping her “to 
learn to budget.”104 Here, different standards were clearly applied to middle-class and 
working-class widows’ needs. The former could expect maintenance of the decent living 
standards they had enjoyed pre-collapse, while workers’ wives were expected to tighten belts 
and live within more modest means, despite having greater financial need. Encouraging 
widows and children to become independent from income support was also a priority. Less 
than a month after the collapse, CWS social workers were asked to pass on information to 
widows about a training scheme they could join.105 
CWS intercessions on behalf of West Gate families provide insights about the nature 
of the families’ treatment. In June 1972, for example, Miss Sharpe requested that an injured 
worker receive a loan of $200. His visitor’s report detailed clothing, dental and car bills that 
exceeded his $36 weekly stipend.106 To emphasise his “deservingness,” she advised that he 
had undertaken a book-keeping course and was hoping to find a job soon.107 This exchange 
reveals several aspects of West Gate victims’ position vis-à-vis the fund — that CWS 
representation was necessary to receive “extra” money, that victims’ income support was 
insufficient for basic needs, and that character assessments based on willingness to work 
influenced decision-making. In another example, a widow wrote to Miss Sharpe about her 
children’s schooling and listed a range of overdue household and car expenses she could not 
pay. Feeling the need to justify her request for money, she wrote, “If I could do without the 
car, I wouldn’t care so much, but there is always somewhere the children want to go and they 
have always been used to a car, plus it’s always handy for emergencies. Hoping you can oblige 
me.”108 Despite having had a car before the collapse, this widow felt compelled to 
characterise the car as a “non-luxury item” for the children, not herself. The exchange also 
reflected Miss Sharpe’s position of power in relation to the widow — that the latter was cast 
in the role of mendicant, that it was not guaranteed that her former lifestyle be maintained 
(unlike the support offered the widows of supervisory staff), and that she had no automatic 
claim on the money collected in families’ names. Discernible class partialities also shaped the 
way trustees and welfare workers viewed certain expenditures. Ballet lessons, artist 
materials, deposits for property purchases etc were not begrudged, while requests to cover 
everyday bills for health care and transport were viewed as evidence of a families’ failure to 
budget sensibly.109  
 A CWS review of its West Gate work described the difficulties its social workers 
encountered.110 Some felt unprepared for dealing with mass grief and the complications 
involved in “nurturing the distressed client” while eliciting factual information about each 
family’s situation. Talking to unwelcome strangers allegedly made some widows anxious and 
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irritable; they were described variously as dazed, in pain, confused, and unable to make 
routine decisions. Welfare workers reported widows’ outbursts about the injustice of their 
situation and lost independence, while others were overwhelmed, apathetic or lethargic.111 
Another document noted the media’s encroachment on the families’ lives which intruded on 
their mourning.112 In a particularly uncertain position were the wives of severely injured men, 
who felt both grief and anger because their husbands faced long-term disability. CWS workers 
had “few formulated ideas about the lifestyles of construction workers” and expressed 
frustration at dealing with clients whose English was difficult to understand. Some resented 
not being the clients’ central focus,113 which is an interesting addendum to Musgrove’s 
identification of most welfare agency “clients” as “politically and socially disempowered.”114 
Clearly used to dealing with individual “cases,” CWS workers were unprepared for the 
collective nature of family and community responses to disaster welfare. The families 
recognised the CWS staff as sources of financial assistance, the review maintained, but often 
only on their own terms. For many widows, the disaster made them welfare recipients for the 
first time and so the relationship between them and their visitors was not underscored by 
habitual forms of behaviour: deference and shame had no place, instead resentment, grief, 
even reluctance to engage, were more common. Some “clients” determined in what form 
relief would be received — financial and administrative help was accepted but any emotional 
counselling social workers offered was refused; it was suspected that some widows were even 
“dodging” CWS visits. Feeling their skills were wasted, case workers expressed resentment 
about the level of financial assistance available to the West Gate families in comparison with 
other needy families. The review posited that “indignation on behalf of the less fortunate 
people may have inhibited their readiness to add to this inequality by spending an unusually 
large amount of time and energy on these clients.”115 There was a mix of responses from 
neighbours and friends; the potential for community and union support among workmates’ 
families was fragmented by the sheer number of victims. That said, widows “kept close 
counsel with each other,” watching what everyone was getting, reinforcing their anger 
against various organisations and protecting each other against “the jealous hostility of 
outsiders” and, in some cases, upsetting the customary power relationship between social 
worker and client.116  
Broader sources of financial support for the families were also canvassed by the 
WGFC. As mentioned earlier, the workers’ compensation scheme in Victoria had been the 
subject of considerable union movement criticism. Two weeks after the collapse, the state 
government hurriedly introduced a bill to increase workers’ compensation entitlements and 
backdated eligibility so that West Gate families would eventually receive the increased 
benefits. Payments rose from $8,000 to $11,834 for the death of a worker and from $200 to 
$263 for each child dependant. Injured workers and family members’ entitlements were also 
increased. Most significantly, deceased workers’ dependants could now claim workers 
compensation without waiving the right to pursue civil damages, as had formerly been the 
case.117 The old system had discriminated against poorer dependants who needed immediate 
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financial relief and could not wait for a court determination. That said, even under the new 
system, compensation payments reduced any damages judgements made. When the widows 
began to engage lawyers to pursue civil action against JHC and others, the fund was asked to 
provide statements regarding the monies families had received in order to mitigate 
payouts.118 Under these circumstances, generous public donations, while providing 
immediate financial relief to the families, also had the effect of reducing corporate and state 
liabilities. Nonetheless, modest legislative improvements in workers compensation policies 
and benefits were impelled by the West Gate tragedy, providing support for Quinlan’s view 
that, when there are multiple workplace fatalities, increased media coverage and public 
attention can impel regulatory reform.119  
Until compensation cases were heard, families’ lives were uncertain, emotionally and 
financially, and the vulnerability of living from week to week was exposed. In a housing 
commission flat, one widow was raising four children on a $35 per week pension, a one-third 
cut to the family’s income. Forced to give up her job at a tannery to care for her children, she 
reported feeling “desperately lonely” in the evenings. Until her court case was heard, the 
fund’s support was all she had, but she was sanguine. “Apart from penny-pinching a bit, and 
missing [her husband] a great deal, we don’t have any real problems.”120 Initially, JHC staff 
reported she had financial difficulties, especially as the couple had bought a car on hire 
purchase prior to the collapse. However, as the fund was being wound up, reports were more 
positive: she had received her workers’ compensation payment and was managing quite 
well.121 Over time, it would appear, closely controlled fund support had been insufficient, but 
a lump sum workers’ compensation payment this widow could manage independently greatly 
improved the family’s situation. 
For all the CWS’s focus on systems, the relationship between the financial and social 
welfare arms of West Gate relief was remarkably ill-defined because the Service’s initial 
involvement came at the behest of the employer, not the WGFC. Social workers completed 
time sheets to account for their work with West Gate families and this information was used 
to substantiate accounts that were sent to the fund trustees.122 Initially, however, the WGFC 
refused to honour the CWS’s account for December 1970, offering one third of the total 
instead.123 By mid-1971, Mrs Beaurepaire was having to chase payments and, after several 
fruitless discussions, threatened media exposure if the money was not forthcoming. Although 
Mr North from Union-Fidelity was not happy about “being threatened,” he invited CWS 
representatives to explain the organisation’s work to the trustees. Although no contract had 
been signed, the CWS explained, the employer had pledged reimbursement for its welfare 
services, an assurance the company was not actually entitled to give. If the account was not 
paid, Sharpe advised, the CWS would withdraw from fund administration, although it would 
continue to support those cases it had already undertaken.124 VTHC official Peter Nolan 
responded that the CWS leaders had not indicated formally that they expected payment and 
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that any fees would necessarily reduce support extended to the West Gate families.125 He had 
understood that all fund committee members were volunteering, failing to distinguish 
between WGFC trustees who had secure incomes and the CWS, which operated on uncertain 
funding arrangements. Nolan’s comments also suggest disregard for the monetary and 
professional value of welfare interventions, thought of as “women’s work.”126 In May 1972, 
nonetheless, the Trustees thanked the CWS for its efforts and made a qualified “ex-gratia 
payment” of $6,000. They wrote: 
 
Consideration will be given to increasing this ex-gratia payment when the objects of 
the Fund have been determined but this indication is not to be taken as any 
undertaking by the Trustees that any further payment can or will be made by the 
Trustees or that they are under any obligation to make any additional payment.127  
 
Again, the West Gate Fund, amassed through the generous public donations, helped to defray 
costs JHC, insurance companies, and the Victorian government might have owed. 
Apart from payments for the West Gate work, however, other benefits accrued to the 
CWS from its involvement in the disaster — raising its community profile and promoting its 
work in the event of future disasters. In December 1970, Miss Sharpe oversaw the final 
programme for a West Gate children’s party to be held at the Melbourne Zoo on 19 
December. Although there were no doubt altruistic reasons for the party, Sharpe 
acknowledged that the children’s excursion would be “a source of further publicity for the 
CWS.”128 Successful strategic positioning also required warding off competition from other 
agencies; Sharpe recommended that the committee adopt “positive planning” to protect the 
West Gate families from “over-exposure…[t]oo many organisations were not necessary as 
families…become confused.”129 Seeing disasters as potential “earners” and wanting to be first 
port of call when they struck, CWS leaders used the experience gained in the West Gate 
collapse to impress government departments and employers who might be inveigled to pay 
for services rendered. Wanting their position formalised within the State Disaster Plan, a 
proposal to this effect was sent to the Premier’s Department, but advice was returned that 
any post-disaster relief operation would fall under the Director-General of Social Welfare’s 
jurisdiction. Private philanthropic organisations might still be involved, but coordination 
would be a government responsibility. Anxious not to cause offence, however, a Premier’s 
Department official wrote, “This decision in no way reflects adversely on the preparedness or 
competency of your Committee to undertake the many duties entailed, and the cooperation 
of your Committee in future disasters will be welcomed, and will significantly add to the 
efficiency of the plan.”130 
The West Gate appeal officially closed on 31 October 1970  and public calls were 
issued for donors to stop giving, although donations arrived for several more weeks.131 As 
early as 1971, the committee was discussing how the fund balance might be fully expended, 
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since some families’ Workers Compensation cases had been resolved. Of the $273,000 to be 
distributed, the balance remaining was still a substantial $189,443, suggesting allocation had 
been frugally administered to that point.132 This financial situation did, however, allow the 
WGFC to prioritise long-term provisions for the children’s education to tertiary level if 
required. Other sums were set aside for housing, unexpected bills, emergencies, and family 
holidays. Finally, in September 1974, the WGFC determined that the residual would be equally 
divided among the widows and injured workers. Whether married or single, with or without 




The West Gate collapse affected families in different ways. Most were supported financially 
by public donations until other income streams became available, but levels of sustenance 
varied. As widows tried to reshape their lives around absent husbands and breadwinners, 
they were encouraged to work and become financially independent. For many, the ability to 
use relief funds and compensation money to clear debt or begin new ventures meant greater 
financial security. Remarriage, retraining and new work opportunities also promised 
significant opportunities. For those widows who remained on state support, however, the 
future was less optimistic. 
Didactic stances towards welfare recipients have waxed and waned over time,134 and 
have proven particularly susceptible to political context. Despite social and political tensions 
between the two committees, the middle-class proclivities of union leaders involved in relief 
fund distribution were remarkably consistent with the CWS’s relief practices and attitudes. 
CWS and JHC personnel were not decision-makers regarding the level of support extended to 
each family, but they were influential in providing the informational basis upon which union 
leader determinations were made; certainly, there was little evidence of disagreement about 
distribution policies. Like the CWS’s nineteenth-century predecessor, judgements were made 
about each deceased man’s workplace character and the widows’ domestic arrangements. 
For those in charge of philanthropic endeavours, a traditional division of labour operated — 
men overseeing management committees, financial decisions and actuarial forecasts, while 
women predominated on the “social” side of fundraising and home visiting.135 Their 
patronising attitudes were somewhat limited by the context — employer responsibility for 
the terrible disaster that precipitated the families’ plight, and the enormous fund at their 
disposal. That said, the commitment to maintaining families’ existing social standing exhibited 
class-bound philosophical limitations with longstanding resonance in the welfare sector. All 
parties involved in the fund’s administration appeared unwilling to accept that working-class 
women, even those with little experience of the welfare system, could manage money 
independently, placing them in the invidious position of appellants, while the living standards 
of managers’ wives were maintained. Indeed, Peel’s finding that working-class women of the 
1930s Depression era were often painted as “stupid,” or unable to comprehend the true 
nature of their predicament, was also discernible in the 1970s.136  
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After promoting counselling as their speciality, the families’ suffering proved too much 
for some CWS staff. In turn, several widows refused passive consumption of CWS services 
and, moreover, were critical of their treatment. At first glance, the West Gate widows might 
have been treated as one “social type”137 — automatically “deserving” — by virtue of their 
position as disaster victims. However, employer and welfare worker assessments were 
influenced by a range of other subjectivities — the family’s level of self-sufficiency pre- and 
post- disaster; domestic circumstances; and the nature of widows’ interaction with case 
workers. Social workers became uncomfortable with any signs of widow’s departure from 
acceptable standards of behaviour, for example, assertiveness, irritation or listlessness were 
not viewed favourably. To an extent, the tragedy that had befallen the widows protected 
them from the kind of stigma often assigned to welfare recipients; nonetheless, case workers’ 
notes reveal annoyance with some migrant widows and frustration that these “clients” were 
not suitably deferential and grateful. West Gate widows were clearly less prepared to “feel 
their position” because of the source and magnitude of their losses. That said, the West Gate 
tragedy provided evidence of enduring class-, gender- and ethnicity-based social attitudes 
that accepted and buttressed inequality. CWS managers observed staff mirroring a 
perception that West Gate widows received “so much” in comparison to other welfare 
recipients.  
 Disasters often inspire altruism, and public donations to assist those suffering can be 
considerable. While JHC management was proactive in organising the post-disaster relief 
effort with like-minded CWS staff, a significant proportion of the aid victims’ families received 
came from various segments of the public purse and thereby reduced demands on state, 
corporate and insurance company coffers. Indeed, when asked in retrospect how the collapse 
had affected the company, John Holland said he had received a lot of sympathy letters and 
that the Department of Main Roads in Sydney, for whom JHC had done work previously, 
assisted it to get another major contract. Of the company’s fortunes after the collapse, he 
said, “I don’t think it had any deleterious effect at all.”138 For those who lost loved ones, 
however, life would never be the same. Indeed, fifty years on, many relatives, friends and 
workmates of West Gate victims still come together at the site of the collapse to mourn the 
dead. 
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